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provide for monetary damages to groups or individuals who are
injured by detrimental federal actions: prophylactic relief is the sole
remedy available. 92 Finally, a court's refusal to enjoin action which
is already underway" conceivably could encourage recalcitrant
agencies to delay completion of the NEPA review to the point where
reevaluation of the action is no longer practicable."
As a result of the court's decision in MPIRG, a federal agency
acting in the Eighth Circuit must prepare an EIS in conjunction
with any proposed action which might have a significant environ-
mental impact, and its failure to do so should cause the cessation of
any work on the project pending the completion of the statement.
The cost to the agency in terms of delaying actions until their
environmental effects have been studied is readily offset by the
benefit inuring to the public from the rigorous enforcement of
NEPA.
JUDITH SCOLNICK
Corporations—Successor's Tort Liability for Acts or Omissions of
Predecessor—Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. '—Plaintiff appellees, Cyr and
the administrator of the estate of Couture, sought damages for
personal injuries and wrongful death against the defendant, B.
Offen & Co., Inc., on theories of negligence and strict liability. 2
These actions arose out of an accident which occurred at the Rum-
ford Press in Concord, New Hampshire on October 29, 1969. The
head pressman suggested that Cyr and Couture clean the drying
ovens that were attached to the press. Cyr and Couture entered the
ovens, placed flammable cleaning solvents near the gas burners, and
set to work. 3 The head pressman, not realizing that Cyr and Cou-
ture had entered the ovens, increased the speed of the press. The
operation of the press was inextricably tied to the working of the
ovens. When the press attained a certain speed, the oven driers
automatically activated. This could be avoided by pushing a saferun
button; however, this safety measure was not used. 4 As a result of
contemplates a suspension of commitments." Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Volpe, 3 ELR 20130, 20131
(E). Hawaii 1972).
92 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 705 (1970). Cf. Canal Auth. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 578 (5th
Cir. 1974).
93 This was the situation in MPIRG. 498 F.2d at 1318.
94 This consideration is more relevant where the project is one which has a definite
termination date, rather than a project which continues indefinitely.
' 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
2 B. Offen & Co., Inc. was a codefendant with R. Hoe & Co., the manufacturer of the
press. Hoe frequently chose Offen ovens to make up the total package of equipment to be
supplied to the purchaser. Id. at 1149 n.3. Hereinafter the B. Offen & Co., Inc. will be
referred to as "the successor" and the B. Offen Company as "the predecessor."
3 Id. at 1148.
4 Id.
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the increased press speed, the gas-fired burners within the oven
ignited and the flammable solvent exploded, seriously injuring Cyr
and resulting in Couture's death. The plaintiffs sought damages on
the theories of negligence and strict liability on the ground that the
absence of a fail-safe mechanism was a defect in the design of the
ovens. 5
The defendant, B. Offen & Co., Inc., was not a legal entity
when the ovens were sold to the Rumford Press in 1959. The ovens
were designed, manufactured, and sold by B. Offen Company, 6 a
sole proprietorship owned by Bernard Offen. 7 Bernard Offen died
in 1962 and his estate contracted to sell the assets of the company in
January 1963 to the defendant B. Offen & Co., Inc. The stockhold-
ers of this successor corporation were a group of employees of the
predecessor and an outside financier.H The sales agreement, exe-
cuted between the estate of Offen and the defendant, provided that
the defendant would acquire an assignment of the lease of real
estate, the goodwill of the B. Offen Company, and the right to use
the tradename "Offen."9
 The agreement also contained an express
exclusion of any liability lb' . tortious acts committed prior to 1962)°'
At the trial, the successor-defendant moved to dismiss, and
subsequently moved for summary judgment and a directed ver-
dict.'' The successor argued: (1) that since it did not come into
existence until January 1963, there existed in 1959 no legal relation-
ship between it and the plaintiff which could lead to a finding of
fault and liability;' 2 and (2) that there was a valid express exclusion
of any assumption of tort liability in the agreement of sale." The
federal district court denied the motion to dismiss and the sub-
sequent motions, ruling that the jury could find the defendant liable
for the torts of its predecessor. 14 In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., the
United States Court of Appeals fdr the First Circuit affirmed the
5 Id, at 1149.
6 The dryers were sold as a component of a printing press manufactured by R. He &
Co., Inc. 1d. at 1149 n.3.
7 Bernard Offen started doing business in 1928 as B. Offen & Co, Brief for Appellant at
5, Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for
Appellant],
Seventy percent of the stock was held by the employees, while thirty percent was held
by the outside financier. 501 F.2d at 1151.
9
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 7, at 6.
1 ° The agreement provided that the purchaser would assume "liability for all costs of any
kind or nature incurred on or after January 16, 1963 on Old Dryer and Service Contracts, .
but excluding specifically liability for costs incurred in tort." 501 F.2d at 1151.
Id.
17 Brief for Appellant, supra note 7, at 13.
17 Id. at 12.
14
 Federal jurisdiction was based on diversity of citizenship. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970),
The jury returned verdicts for each plaintiff on both counts, against both R. Hoe Co., Inc.
and B. Offen Co., Inc. in the amount of $45,000 in negligence and $60,000 in strict liability.
501 F.2d at 1149. The court of appeals in Offen reduced the recovery in strict liability to
$45,000. Id. at 1150,
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district court. Applying New Hampshire substantive law, the court
HELD: where there is sufficient similarity and continuity between
the predecessor and successor, the successor is not immune from
liability for the torts of the predecessor."
The general rule, known as the successorship doctrine, is that a
successor corporation is not liable for the torts of its predecessor. 16
An exception to this rule traditionally exists where the successor
corporation is a mere continuation of the predecessor.' 7 The Offen
court, while recognizing the general rule, and acknowledging that
the facts presented did not fulfill the requirements of the continuity
exception," formulated new criteria to determine what is meant by
"continuity" for the purposes of imposing tort liability upon a suc-
cessor corporation. The court justified its finding of continuity on
the basis of the policy underlying the law of products liability.' 9
This note will present an analysis of the disposition of the issue
of continuity by the court in Offen. First, the factors utilized by the
court in determining continuity will be examined. Then, the policy
considerations relied upon by the court to justify the imposition of
tort liability upon the successor corporation will be scrutinized. It
will be contended that the court's rationale does not support the
result reached, and that the decision in Offen, if followed, will
impose inhibitory and unpredictable burdens on the commercial
transfer of assets.
It is the general rule that where one company sells or otherwise
transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is not liable for
the debts and liabilities of the transferor. 2 ° Notwithstanding the
proliferation of products liability litigation and the resultant legal
literature on the subject, neither the courts nor the legal scholars
have considered in depth the extent of the legal liability of a succes-
sor corporation for the torts of its predecessor.
The continuity exception to the general rule against tort liability
of successors has been developed by case law 2 ' and has been applied
15 501 F.2d at 1155.
16
 15 W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of Corporations §§ 7122-23, at 188-98 (rev. vol. 1973);
Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968) (applying the general rule
under California law).
17
 Abeken v. United States, 26 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Mo. 1939).
18
 501 F.2d at 1151. Exceptions have been recognized where there has been: (1) express
or implied agreement, Erhard v. Boone State Bank, 65 F.2d 48 (8th Cir. 1933); (2) consolida-
tion or merger, West Tex. Ref. & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1933); (3) a
finding that the successor is a mere continuation of the predecessor, Abeken v. United States,
26 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Mo. 1939); and (4) fraud, International Ass'n of Machinists v. Shawnee
Indus., Inc., 224 F. Supp. 347 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
L 9 501 F.2d at 1153-54. See text at notes 80-90 supra.
m Id. at 1152.
21 E.g., Bishop v. Dura-Lite Mfg. Co., 489 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1973); West Tex. Ref. &
Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1933). The continuity exception refers
principally to a "reorganization" of the original corporation, such as occasionally is ac-
complished under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, II U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1970). 19 Am.
Jur. Corporations §§ 1546, 1550 at 922-23, 926-27 (1965).
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only where the successor corporation is merely a reorganization of
the predecessor, that is, "merely a 'new hat' for the seller. ”22 Al-
though this standard was developed in a tax case, 23 it has been
applied to many cases involving liability for many types of acts and
transactions of the predecessor, 24 and to cases where the predecessor
is a proprietorship or partnership. 25 Recent cases have failed to
impose tort liability upon the successor where there is no evidence of
continuity of ownership or management and thus no basis for apply-
ing the exception to the general rtile. 26 In Chadwick v. Air Reduc-
tion Co., 27 a suit was brought against a dissolved corporation and a
successor which had purchased the assets of the dissolved corpora-
tion without an agreement to assume the dissolved corporation's
liabilities. The district court affirmed the rule that when one com-
pany sells all of its assets to another company, the latter is not liable
for the torts of the transferor. 28 The rule of successor's non-liability
was also affirmed in McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 29 where the
court held that the purchaser of the assets of the manufacturer of a
paper cutting machine did not expressly or impliedly assume
liabilities of the manufacturer and was not liable for injuries sus-
tained by the use of a machine manufactured prior to the sale of the
business. 30 Thus, in determining whether to impose liability upon a
successor for a predecessor's tort, courts have accorded substantial
weight to the contractual arrangements regarding tort liability in the
transfer agreement.
In Offen, the court found these prior cases recognizing a con-
tinuity exception distinguishable, however, because the rule of suc-
cessor non-liability had evolved in the context of tax assessment. 3 '
On this basis, the court justified its development of a different test
of continuity in negligence cases. Yet, several negligence decisions
have dealt directly with the issue of defining continuity for the
22
 McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 98, 106 (1970).
23 West Tex. Ref. & Dev, Co. v. Commissioner, 68 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1933).
24
 E,g., Copease Mfg. Co. v. Cormac Photocopy Corp., 242 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.
1965) (patent infringement claim); Pierce v. Riverside Mortgage Sec. Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d
248, 77 F.2d 226 (1938) (liability for fraud of predecessor); Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Agency v,
Flash Cab Co., 110 III. App. 2d 415, 249 N.E.2d 729 (1969) (court held contract liability was
assumed where the assets of the predecessor were owned and controlled by the same people);
McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970) (liability for machine
defectively manufactured); American Hosp. & Life Ins. Co. v. Kunkel, 71 N.M. 164, 376
P.2d 956 (1962) (liability on notes of assumed corporation).
25
 E.g., In Re Johnson-Hart Co., 34 F.2d 183 (D. Minn, 1929); Abeken v. United States,
26 F. Supp. 170 (E.D. Mo. 1939).
26
 E.g., Copease Mfg. Co. v. Cormac Photocopy Corp., 242 F. Supp. 993 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F; Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965); Bill Hodges
Truck Co. v. Williams, 470 P.2d 310 (Okla, 1970).
27
 239 F, Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
28 Id. at 250.
2°
 109 N.J. Super, 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970).
3° Id. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106.
31 501 F.2d at 1152 (distinguishing West Tex. Ref. & Dev. Co. v. Commissioner, 68
F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1933)).
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purpose of imposing tort liability upon the successor. In Kloberdanz
v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 32 the court stated:
[N]or can the buyer be said to be a mere continuation of
the seller. The seller continued to exist after the sale for
eight months, and there was no common identity of stock,
directors, officers or stockholders between Joy and the
seller. This exception covers a reorganization of a corpora-
tion. 33
The court in McKee 34 also dealt with the continuity exception and
found that for tort liability to attach, the purchasing corporation
must represent merely a "new hat" for the seller. 35
Offen did not present a factual setting appropriate for the
application of the continuity exception to the rule of successor non-
liability, as that exception has been defined in prior decisions. In
Offen, it clearly appeared that both the ownership and management
of the successor were entirely different from those of the predeces-
sor. 36 The successor was further distinguished from its predecessor
by its expansion of the products line to include electronic controls,
moisture applicators, chill water systems and other equipment in
addition to the dryer and oven equipment. 37
Unable to place the facts of the case at bar within the tradi-
tional exception, the court chose to formulate new indicia to deter-
mine continuity. 38 The inquiry of the court focused upon the "fac-
tors to look to in order to determine whether there is sufficient
continuity to warrant continued obligation."39 Initially the court
drew an analogy to the field of labor law, where successor corpora-
tions, in certain situations, have been held bound by the undertak-
ings of their predecessors. 4° The court relied upon the method of
analysis utilized in the labor cases—sifting through specific facts to
find continuity.
In John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 41 the Supreme Court held
that rights of employees under a collective bargaining agreement are
not automatically lost by the disappearance of the employer through
32 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968).
33 Id. at 821.
34 109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970).
35 Id. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106.
" 501 F.2d at 1151.
37 Brief for Appellant, supra note 7, at 8.
" 501 F.2d at 1152.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1152-53, (discussing Howard Johnson Co. v. Hotel & Restaurant Employees,
417 U.S. 249 (1974); NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972); John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964)).
41 376 U.S. 543 (1964). Respondent labor union brought an action under § 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1970), to compel arbitration under a
collective bargaining agreement executed by a company which the petitioner acquired by
merger.
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a merger, since the successor employer may be required to arbitrate
with the union. 42 The Court, in NLRB v. Burns International
Security Services, Inc.," however, withdrew from Wiley by limit-
ing the nature of the obligation of the successor. In Burns the Court
recognized that "although successor employers may be bound to
recognize and bargain with the union, they are not bound by the
substantive provisions of a collective-bargaining contract negotiated
by their predecessors but not agreed to or assumed by them."'"
The Supreme Court has recently retreated even further from
the Wiley decision. In Howard Johnson Co., v. Hotel & Restaurant
Employees,'" the Court held that a successor was not required to
arbitrate with the union where there was not substantial continuity
in the work force of the successor and the seller, and where there
had been no express or implied assumption of the agreement to
arbitrate on the part of the successor." The utilization of this
method of analysis in these cases has severely limited the applicabil-
ity of the Wiley result to other fact situations.
It is submitted that Wiley can be distinguished from Offen. The
Wiley decision was based on the key role of arbitration in effectuat-
ing national labor policy. 47 Concededly, the policies underlying the
law of products liability may similarly support the result reached in
Offen. However, Wiley arose as the result of a merger." There is
little question that the present state of the law provides for a
successor's tort liability after a merger. 49 In contrast, Offen involved
a sale of assets, as opposed to a merger. Furthermore, the facts in
Wiley indicate that the union clearly asserted its rights under the
agreement both before and after the merger." In Offen, the succes-
sor at the time of the sale had no premonition, notice, or means of
376 U.S. at 548.
43 406 U.S. 272 (1972). Wackenhut Corp., a company that had provided plant protection
for a Lockheed Aircraft Service Co. factory, had entered into a collective bargaining agree-
ment with the United Plant Guard Workers. When Wackenhut's service contract expired, it
was succeeded by Burns International Security Services, which knew of the existing collective
bargaining agreement. Burns refused to recognize the UPC and refused to honor the collective
bargaining agreement. Id. at 274-75.
44
 Id. at 284.
45 417 U.S. 249 (1974). Petitioner purchased the assets of a restaurant and motor lodge
under an agreement whereby the sellers, who had been operating the enterprises under
franchises from petitioner, retained the real property and leased it to petitioner. The petitioner
expressly did not assume any of the seller's obligations, including those under any collective
bargaining agreement, Id. at 251,
96 Id. at 264.
47 376 U.S. at 549.
4" Id. at 545.
49 See, e.g., Pierce v. Riverside Mortgage Sec. Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 248, 77 P.2d 226
(1938); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Wanless v. Peabody
Coal Co., 294 III. App, 401, 13 N.E.2d 996 (1938). Furthermore, the Wiley decision was
rendered against a background of state law that embodied the general rule that in merger
situations the surviving corporation is liable for the obligations of the disappearing corpora-
tion. 376 U.S. at 547, applying N.Y. Stock Corp. Law § 90 (McKinney 1951).
5° 376 U.S. at 550.
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assessing what potential causes of action might be brought against it
due to the actions or omissions of the predecessor; nor was any claim
ever made, prior to the accident, that the dryers were defectively
designed and manufactured." Finally, labor agreements are written
contractual agreements which parties are aware of at the time of a
sale of assets. Unlike labor contract claims, tort claims are not based
on prior written agreements, and a successor is not able to estimate
at the time of sale what the basis of a future claim might be. Not
only is Wiley distinguishable on the facts, but the Court in Wiley
indicated the limited nature of the decision and speculated that the
result might be different if there had not been substantial continuity
of identity due to the merger, or if the union had failed to make its
claims known. 52 Thus the limited nature of the Wiley decision and
its narrow applicability to other fact situations support careful
scrutiny of the facts utilized by the court in Offen to find continuity.
The first factor to which the Offen court attached significance in
determining continuity was the extent of the obligations assumed by
the successor in the language of the sales agreement. The agreement
provided in pertinent part that the purchaser would "(i) cause the
Offen Business to be operated continuously . . . (ii) cause the Offen
Business to be operated substantially in accordance with the same
business practices and policies as are being employed by 'Offen at
the date of the agreement." 53 However, rather than being persua-
sive as to whether there was a continuation of the same organiza-
tion, a more reasonable interpretation of this language may be that
it represented an attempt to provide a protection device for the
estate of Bernard Offen which, according to the sales agreement,
was to be paid over a period of nine years. 54
The second factor emphasized by the court in determining
continuity was that the nature of the business remained substan-
tially similar. 55 However, it is to be expected that when one com-
pany purchases all the assets of another, the purchasing corporation
will continue the operations of the former. 56 This should not in itself
render the purchaser liable for the obligations of the former. 57 For
example, in McKee v. Harris
-Seybold Co., it was stated:
[t]he lands, buildings, machinery and tradenames were
sold, and it is apparent that the purchaser intended to
make use of all these in the manufacture of the same type
of product. . . . [T]here is no evidence of continuity of
management, . . . [T]here was also no continuity of stock-
holder investment . . . For liability to attach, the pur-
51
 Brief for Appellant, supra note 7, at 7, 18, 26.
52
 376 U.S. at 551.
S3 501 F.2d at 1151.
54
 Id.
55 Id.
56
 McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 109 N.J. Super. 555, 570, 264 A.2d 98, 106 (1970).
" Id.
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chasing corporation must represent merely a "new hat" for
the seller."
It would be an unusual situation for one company to purchase all of
the seller's assets and facilities and then drastically alter the nature
of the business. This determinant of continuity utilized by the court
in Offen would be applicable to most agreements for the purchase of
assets.
A third factor considered by the court was the successor's
failure to notify third parties of the change in ownership. Reasoning
that this failure induced reliance by third parties on the assumption
that there was merely a continuation of the same business, the court
concluded that the failure to notify should be a significant factor in a
determination of continuity for the purpose of imposing liability. 59
Although notification would have informed potential third parties of
the change in ownership, it is doubtful that it would have had any
practical effect on the behavior of the parties previous to the time of
the accident. Notification of a transaction that occurred in 1963
would have had little influence on the behavior of the parties up to
the time of the 1969 accident. The importance of notification in
contractual relationships is not necessarily applicable to tort law.
In Offen, the court stressed the importance of notification beyond its
practical usefulness.
The substantial continuity of the work force was the final factor
relied upon by the court. 6° However, the criterion of continuity of
employees, which has served as a basis for imposing labor law
obligations upon the successor, is not necessarily relevant to the
issue of successor tort liability. The court intimates that it was the
retained employees who were responsible for the faulty design; 61 but
the record is clear that Bernard Offen, rather than his employees,
designed the ovens. 62 Even if the facts did establish the responsibil-
ity of the employees for the defective design, it is certainly question-
able whether the burden of liability should be imposed on the
successor for torts his present employees may have committed dur-
ing their employment by the predecessor. Continuity of workforce as
a factor in determining continuity for the purpose of imposing
liability should bear less weight in cases involving tort claims than it
does in cases involving labor agreements.
A factor in determining continuity which has been significant in
other cases, and which may have been influential in the Offen
decision, although not specifically dealt with by the court, is the
58 Id.
59 501 F.2d at 1153.
60 Id. at 1154,
Id.
62 "Ben Offen . . . was considered to be the sales force, director of engineering and
supervisor of every other function of a company of some ten employees. . . . Ben Offen
personally handled each job, including supervision of the drawings." Brief for Appellant at 5,
Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant].
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viability of the predecessor to compensate the injured parties. 63 At
the time the action in the instant case was brought by the plaintiffs,
the estate of Bernard Offen was closed," thus prohibiting the plain-
tiffs from seeking recovery against it. Although there are instances
where liability has not been imposed on the successor even when the
predecessor was no longer existent, 65 some cases have stressed the
viability of the predecessor when refusing to impose liability on the
successor. 66 In Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 67 where the succes-
sor was held not liable, the court construed Ohio statutory law 68 as
extending the viability of dissolved corporations for the purpose of
suit, thereby not foreclosing the plaintiff's claim against the pre-
decessor. 69 In Pierce v. Riverside Mortgage Securities Co.," a
successor corporation was found not to be liable to the plaintiff for
the predecessor's fraud where the successor had paid a sum to the
predecessor which was more than sufficient to liquidate the plain-
tiffs claim against the latter. 71 Moreover, in Kloberdanz v. Joy
Manufacturing Co., 72 where the predecessor had been dissolved,
liability was not imposed upon either the successor or the predeces-
sor. However, the court noted that the emphasis should be placed
on whether there was a bona fide sale involving the payment of
money enabling the predecessor to respond to actions. 73
The predecessor's viability is usually examined in a determina-
tion of whether the successor or the predecessor should be held
liable. In Offen, as in the cases involving labor agreements, the
choice presented was between providing relief through the successor
or providing no relief at all, as the predecessor could not be reached.
Thus, the nonviability of Bernard Offen's estate to the injured
plaintiffs appeared to have provided the court with the impetus to
redefine continuity in a much more flexible manner in order to reach
the "deep pocket" of the successor and, thereby to provide relief to
the plaintiffs.
It would seem that the same arguments that justify termination
63 E.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co.., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). .
6' Brief for Appellant, supra note 62, at 8.
65 Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968); Chadwick v. Air
Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247, 250 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
Copease Mfg. Co. v. Cormac Photocopy Corp., 242 F. Supp. 993, 1013 (S.D.N.Y.
1965); Pierce v. Riverside Mortgage Sec. Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 248, 256, 77 P.2d 226, 230
(1938).
67 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
68 Ohio Rev. Code Ann.	 1701.88(B) (1971).
69 239 F. Supp. at 251.
70 25 Cal. App. 2d 248, 77 P.2d 226 (1938).
71 Id. at 257, 77 P.2d at 230.
72 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968). This case arose out of an accident that occurred at
an oil drilling rig. The plaintiff sought damages on a products liability theory. Although
named defendants included Web-Wilson, Inc., the manufacturer of the allegedly defective
part, and Joy Manufacturing Company, the successor to Web-Wilson, Web-Wilson had been
dissolved. Id. at 818.
75 Id. at 820-21.
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of liability upon dissolution are applicable to a predecessor corpora-
tion which has sold its assets. The practical need to provide for the
termination of liability upon dissolution of a corporation has been
recognized in various jurisdictions" including New Hampshire. 75
The compromise drawn between compensating injured persons and
settling the affairs of a dissolved corporation is necessary. If the
predecessor had liquidated rather than sold the business, the plain-
tiffs would not have a viable defendant as the accident occurred
beyond the statutory period of liability. Imposing such obligations
on the successor places on it a burden which a dissolved predecessor
would not have to bear. The Supreme Court in NLRB v. Burns Inter-
national Security Services, Inc. 76 recognized the unfair burden that
was attached to a flexible expansion of the successor doctrine: "The
consequences of the application of the successor doctrine . . has
been that the successor employer has been subjected to certain
burdens or obligations to which a similarly situated employer who
was not a successor would not be subject." 77 It would appear to be
clear that the search for a deep pocket cannot go unchecked to the
point where no preexisting relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant is required. "In the absence of a transfer of assets without
adequate consideration, the alternative basis for the decision, ap-
pearing to rest on continuity of business, name, and management
alone, is not, we think, sufficient basis for holding a transferee liable
for the debts of a transferor" 78 If followed, the Offer decision, which
deviates from the predictability of established doctrine and imposes
heavy burdens on successor corporations, 79 will have an inhibitory
impact on the commercial transfer of assets.
In resolving the issue of continuity the court in Offen recognized
the competing policies of protecting both successor corporate entities
which rely upon the assumption of a known set of liabilities, and
users of products who are not conscious of any change in the
manufacturer's responsibility. 80 However, the First Circuit found
the former policy less compelling. The court justified the treatment
of the successor as a continuation of the predecessor proprietorship
on the ground that certain considerations which underlie the doc-
trine of liability of a manufacturer for damage and personal injury
14 See Henn & Alexander, Effect of Corporate Dissolution on Product Liability Claims,
56 Cornell L. Rev. 865, 887-88 (1971).
75
 See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 294, § 98 (1955), which provides in part: "Any
corporation dissolved . . . shall nevertheless continue as a body corporate for the term of three
years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits . . . ."
76 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
77
 Id. at 300.
J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v. Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 40, 206 N.W. 2d 365, 370 (1973).
79
 The standard of conduct required for protection according to the Offen rationale might
include the following burdens: inspection and perfection of all products produced by the
predecessor; high costs of insurance; the inability to offer positions to the employees of the
predecessor; and the inability to use the tradename.
8D 501 F.2d at 1152-53.
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caused by defective products are also pertinent to the liability of the
successor of the manufacturer. 8 ' To determine whether there are
sufficient reasons for extending successor liability to product liability
claims, the rationale for the application of the successorship doctrine
must be viewed in light of the policy considerations underlying
products liability.
The criteria for the application of both the general rule of
successor nonliability and the merger, fraud and contractual excep-
tions to that rule indicate that the doctrine is based upon a policy of
not burdening the new corporation with the liabilities of its pre-
decessor. The continuity exception is consistent with this policy, as
the successor is not viewed as a new entity. The courts have applied
a clearly defined standard requiring "reorganization of the same
entity" to find continuity, not a mere similarity determined by a
combination of factors. 82
The opinion of the court in Offen recognized several rationales
underlying the imposition of strict liability upon a manufacturer: (1)
the manufacturer is generally able to protect itself and bear the
costs, while the consumer is frequently helpless; (2) it is the man-
ufacturer who has launched the product into the channels of trade; 83
(3) it is the manufacturer who has violated the representation of
safety implicit in putting the product into the stream of commerce;
(4) the manufacturer is the source of potential improvement in the
product's quality; and (5) the negligence, if any, is that of the
employees of the manufacturer." However, the court recognized
that certain of the above rationales are not applicable to a successor
corporation." Yet, the decision to impose strict liability appears to
be justifiable only when all of the above reasons are present. This is
especially true in the absence of any control of, or relationship with,
the product at the time it was entered into the stream of commerce.
The imposition of strict liability does not appear to be justified in
the case of a defendant corporation who neither designed, manufac-
tured, assembled, sold, warranted or controlled the product. Al-
though the application of products liability has never been keyed to
the fault of the manufacturer, there remains the essential link of
control and responsibility of the manufacturer, seller or other per-
sons actively participating in placing the product into the stream of
commerce and profiting from the ultimate purchase of the prod-
°I Id.
82
 Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817 (D. Colo. 1968); Pierce v. Riverside
Mortgage Sec. Co., 25 Cal. App. 2d 248, 77 P.2d 226 (1938); McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co.,
109 N.J. Super. 555, 264 A.2d 98 (1970). See text at notes 53-62, supra.
83 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod. Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr.
697 (1963).
84 501 F.2d at 1154.
85
 The court specifically recognized that the second and third rationales were not appli-
cable. Id. As to the fourth rationale, the question might be raised as to whether a successor
corporation should be under an obligation to inspect and evaluate all products previously
manufactured by its predecessor.
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uct. 86 In Offen, the new corporation had neither controlled nor
profited from the product, and the only reason for subjecting it to
products liability appears to have been its deep pocket.
The Offen decision is based on the assumption that the succes-
sor is in a position to insure himself. 87 This assumption is not
necessarily valid. In the case of a predecessor, such as the B. Offen
Company, which had been in operation for many years and pro-
duced ovens now operating on several continents," it is probably
unlikely that an underwriter would insure the successor. Even if it is
possible for a successor corporation to procure liability insurance, 89
it is unlikely that it will be at a reasonable cost, thus putting
successor organizations at a competitive disadvantage as compared
to non-successor organizations operating in the same market.
Although the purpose of imposing strict liability is to create a
broader and more widely available basis of recovery, the basis has
always been linked to a seller or manufacturer. "At the very least
there should be a feeling that the defendant has done or omitted to
do something which justifies blaming him for the ensuing injury." 9 °
In searching for a deep pocket the courts are concerned with the
mass of consumers unable to protect themselves. But in extending
this doctrine by the imposition of strict liability upon a successor,
the need to be fair to the successor manufacturer, as well as to the
injured parties, cannot be overlooked. If, through the Offen deci-
sion, the theory of tort liability is broadened beyond those who had
actual control of and responsibility for the distribution of the prod-
uct, to apply to subsequent purchasers of the assets of that corpora-
tion, then the principle of fairness, with respect to corporations, has
been abandoned to afford compensation to the injured user. Utiliz-
ing a standard of "sufficient factors of similarity" to reach the deep
pocket of a corporation who had neither responsibility for nor
control over the product establishes a burdensome precedent.
Prior to the decision in Offen, the standard for continuity was
predictable. 9 ' In Kloberdanz, continuity was not found where there
was no common identity of stock, directors, officers or stockholders
" Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 75, at 494-95 (4th ed, 1971).
87 501 F,2d at 1154.
89 Brief for the Appellant, supra note 62, at 5.
89 The Offen Corporation was insured; however, the insurance was predicated on the
assumption that the Offen Corporation would not be liable for the torts of its predecessor.
Interview with Joseph Devan, Attorney for Appellant, in Manchester, New Hampshire, Sept.
30, 1974,
9° See Comment, 20 Syracuse L. Rev, 924 (1969).
Continuity means reorganisation. As the court in J.F. Anderson Lumber Co. v.
Myers, 296 Minn. 33, 206 N.W. 2d 365 (1973), stated'
The mere fact that a purchasing corporation is "carrying the same business" as the
selling corporation is not sufficient to make the purchasing corporation liable for the
debts of the selling corporation, The purchasing corporation in the instant case was
not a continuation of the selling corporation within the meaning of the exception to
the general rule.
Id. at 38-39, 206 N.W. 2d at 369.
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between the two corporations. 92 In McKee, where the lands, build-
ings, machinery, and tradenames were all transferred to the succes-
sor who continued to manufacture the same type of product, the
court found no liability since there was no evidence of continuity of
management or ownership."
Competent business decisions are made daily in matters involv-
ing the acquisition of commercial interests. Where unknown or
contingent liabilities may exist it is essential to a sound commercial
decision that the law pertinent to the assumption of a predecessor
corporation's liabilities be clear and predictable. The Offen decision,
by utilizing a "sufficient similiar factors" approach in determining
continuity, provides little guidance as to what course of conduct
should be undertaken by a potential transferee. The standard of
conduct required for protection might be the inspection and perfec-
tion of past products of the predecessor; 94 the inability to offer
positions to the employees of the predecessor; and the inability to
use the tradename so as not to be in any way related to the goodwill
of the predecessor. If followed, this deviation from the predictability
of past corporate liability doctrine will have an inhibitory impact on
the commercial transfers of assets.
MICHAEL A. DEANGELIS
Employment Discrimination—Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967—Bona Fide Occupational Qualification—Hodgson v.
Greyhound Lines, inc. 1 —The Secretary of Labor 2 brought suit
against Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound), the nation's largest
intercity bus carrier, 3 alleging that Greyhound's policy of refusing to
accept applications for the position of intercity bus driver from
persons thirty-five years of age and older 4 violated the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act (ADEA or Act). 5 Specifically, the
92
 288 F. Supp. at 821.
92
 109 N.J. Super. at 570, 264 A.2d at 106.
94
 The Offen Company had been operating since 1928 and had produced hundreds of
products which were located on several continents. Brief for Appellant, supra note 62 at 5. In
Chadwick v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D. Ohio 1965), the court found that
even when the successor knew that the predecessor had put a negligently designed device into
the channels of commerce it was under no duty to warn third parties. Id. at 250.
1 499 F.2d 859 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, — S. Ct. — (1975).
2 The Secretary of Labor has the authority to enforce compliance with the ADEA. 29
U.S.C. § 216 (Supp. 1975); 29 U.S.C. § 626 (Supp. 1974).
3 Hodgson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 354 F. Supp. 230, 232 (N.D. III. 1973).
499 F.2d at 860. Although Greyhound refuses to accept applications for the position of
intercity bus driver from persons over 35, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA) applies only to individuals between the ages of 40 and 65. 29 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp.
1974). Thus, plaintiffs between 35 and 40 presumably would still be subject to discrimination
on the basis of age even if Greyhound's request for a BFOQ was denied.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. (Supp. 1974). For a discussion of the Act in general, see
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